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Abstract 
Wind resistance is the primary external factor teams organise themselves around in cycling. In order to 
share this burden, members of opposing teams often cooperate, e.g. to secure the existence of a 
breakaway. To avoid free-riders the riders in question form a tacit social contract on sharing the work-
load. Taking its point of departure in qualitative interviews with Danish elite cyclists, this study 
demonstrates how the social contract sometimes becomes explicit, and riders form an agreement of the 
podium placing in the final breakaway before they arrive at the finish line.  This study examines riders' 
explanations of and attitudes to such agreements and discusses to what extent they should be regarded 
as match-fixing. While the available evidence suggests that the agreements are best understood as an 
integrated element of cycling culture with a purpose of upholding a certain social order, this study also 
demonstrates how the social contract and the accompanying agreements imply corruption in the sport 
of cycling, if only in germ form. On this basis, the study concludes that it is only the sport's culture 
and individual riders' self-discipline that can protect cycling from real corruption. 
Keywords:  agreements, cooperation, reciprocal altruism, sporting ethos, socialisation, corruption
Resumen
La resistencia al viento es el principal factor externo alrededor del cual los equipos ciclistas se 
organizan. Para compartir esta carga los miembros de los equipos rivales a menudo cooperan, esto es , 
para asegurar la existencia de una escapada. Para evitar free-riders, los corredores en cuestión llevan a 
cabo un contrato social tácito de compartir la carga de trabajo. Tomando como punto de arranque 
entrevistas cualitativas con ciclistas de élite daneses, este estudio demuestra como el contrato social 
tácitos a veces deviene explícito, y los corredores realizan un acuerdo para repartirse las plazas del 
podio en el final de la escapada antes de llegar a línea de meta. Este estudio también examina las 
explicaciones de los corredores así como las actitudes hacia tales acuerdos y discute hasta cierto punto 
que deben ser considerados amaños. Mientras que las pruebas disponibles sugieren que los acuerdos 
son mejor entendidos como elementos integrados en la cultura ciclista con un propósito de mantener 
un cierto orden social, este estudio también demuestra como el contrato social y los acuerdos que los 
acompañan implican corrupción en el ciclismo, aunque sea en un forma germinal. Sobre esta base,  el 
estudio concluye que solo la cultura del propio deporte y la autodisciplian de los corredores puede 
proteger al ciclismo frente a la corrupción.
Términos Clave: acuerdos, cooperación, reciprocidad altruismo, etos deportivo, socialización, 
corrupción.
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                “No one who hasn't got the class will have the laurel wreaths hung around their 
necks” (Werner, 1958)
1. Introduction
When the Kazakh Alexandre Vinokourov and the Russian Alexandr Kolobnev attacked 15 
kilometres before the finish line in the 2010 edition of one of professional cycling's most 
prestigious events, the spring classic Liège-Bastagne-Liège, neither Cadel Evans, Alejandro 
Valverde, Philppe Gilbert, Alberto Contador nor any of the other favourites were able to follow 
them.1 The two co-operated in an exemplary manner, but when they reached the last climb in 
Liège, Vinokourov broke away  and rode across the finish line 100 metres ahead of Kolobnev, to 
one of his career's biggest triumphs. For the 36 year old Vinokourov, who had just returned from 
a two year long doping suspension, it was an important victory. "I showed", as he said himself, 
“that Vino is here, Vino c'est la classe. I am finished with this wrong and dark page of my 
history. I would like to show all of you that I can win great races without doping. I am 
trying to earn your trust. Today is the best proof and revenge for me.” (Brown, 2010)
However, just over 18 months later, in December 2011, the Swiss magazine L'Illustre told 
its readers that  they were in possession of an e-mail correspondence between Vinokourov and 
Kolobnev, which allegedly documented that Vinokourov had paid Kolobnev €150,000 to secure 
his support on the last kilometres towards his 2010 victory. Vinokourov, unsurprisingly, denied 
that he had bought Kolobnev's help and claimed that the money was only a loan to the Russian 
(Cyclingnews, 2011).
In the international cycling media the case once again brought riders' moral standards on 
the agenda; could it really be true that riders could buy such a prestigious victory, and if so, how 
can fans be sure all races aren’t fixed? The case, however, did not lead to questions about pro-
riders' credibility in general. But that agreements involving money  and podium placing are made 
is not a phenomenon restricted to Eastern European riders or the professional peloton. It also 
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                       Ask Christiansen & Martin Wang
Fair Play ISSN: 2014-9255
1 An earlier version of this paper has previously been published in Danish, with the title: "Du kan ikke købe dig til 
noget du ikke er" – om aftalte resultater blandt danske cykelryttere (Hjørngaard & Christiansen, 2012)
66
exists in lower ranked races in Denmark, as Danish cycling's grand old man, Henrik Elmgreen, 
reported on in the Danish daily, Politiken, in 2001:
“The scene is a town in the province; we are at the yearly criterion, a race around the local 
shopping mall. Two young amateur riders have broken away and the race will be decided 
between them. One is from the local club and would like to win. "That's all right", says his 
competitor, "but then I want your prize money!" And so it came to be. The incident is taken 
from real life, and took place 5 to 6 years ago, but it  could have happened yesterday, today 
or 50 or 100 years ago for that matter. And it will happen again tomorrow.” (Elmgreen, 
2001). 
Elmgreen wrote the piece as a reaction to a heated debate on buying and selling victories in 
cycling, which Politiken had been covering for the past week. It was the loser himself who had 
told Elmgreen about the episode. As one of the elder statesmen in Danish cycling, one would 
perhaps expect Elmgreen to report the culprits to the Danish Cycle Union (DCU) so the two 
could receive their well-deserved punishment, or at least take them to task and teach them how 
unsportsmanlike and morally  reprehensible their actions were. But Elmgreen did neither. He 
considered "the incident as banal and harmless". But why is this? Isn't it cheating and rigged 
game like the series of articles in Politiken indicated and as also suggested in the case with 
Vinokourov's 2010 victory? Isn't it in line with a destructive activity like match-fixing, which 
deceive spectators into believing what they  are watching is an open, unplanned competition? 
Isn’t such deception something sport should strike hard upon? "No", Elmgreen replies, because 
"you can't buy something you aren't" (Elmgreen, 2001).2
That point of view is not straightforwardly  understandable. For the outsider, neither in the 
Belgian nor in the Danish case was it a question of pure competition between the two who were 
strongest on day, such as the ethos of sport dictates, but that the riders in question agreed on the 
result before they reached the finish line. Fixing the match, indeed. And it is an established fact 
that fixing matches is destructive to sport.3 That at least was the fear for Danske Spil, the national 
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2 As can be seen, we have borrowed Elmgreen's statement and heading for this paper.
3  When using the word 'sport' in this article, we refer to achievement sport,  which means that the activity must 
involve competition, have a hierarchical structure, where results are ascribed meaning, an institutional framework 
and be governed by a set of written rules (Møller, 2010).
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Danish lottery operator, who in 2001 stated that they would "consider whether they should 
continue to offer betting on for instance Tour de France". As the chairman Leif Mikkelsen 
explained: "In general we always have to preserve our reliability, which means that we cannot 
offer betting on events where doubts are raised regarding the results. Therefore we also have to 
consider our position on cycle sport."
But it is worth examining whether Elmgreen has a point. The sport of cycling has a 
fundamental feature that makes it different from all other sports: It is unique in the sense that the 
athlete has to cooperate with his/hers competitors in order to have success. If s/he doesn't learn 
that, s/he won't win many  victories. Most obviously the cooperation is seen among riders in a 
breakaway who take turns leading the group, by means of which they share the burden of 
breaking the wind. Other times, cycling teams work together to chase down breakaways as their 
interest dictates. But as the previous examples illustrate, the cooperation sometimes go further 
than this.
In this paper we give an account of how riders in the decisive breakaway in some races 
agree on the result, and share out the placing among them, before they reach the finish line. We 
examine how and why such agreements are made, how riders understand and handle them, and 
discuss to what extent they should be seen as swindles and foul play  caused by corrupt morals on 
the implicated riders' part. Or if they  can be understood as an inherent element of the sport, that, 
among other things, contributes to preserving a form of social order in the races.
The paper's point of departure is the best Danish cycling league, the A-class. The A-class is 
a semi-professional league with a comparatively high level of competition. It consists of 4-7 so-
called continental teams (also known as 3rd division teams), and equally as many national teams. 
Altogether the A-class consists of 120-150 riders. Approximately half of them are paid by their 
team, while the other half rides on an amateur basis. The study is analytical as much as it is 
empirical. We did, however, do long, qualitative, semi-structured, in-depth interviews, applying 
the recommended guidelines (Silverman, 2010), with three active riders from the A-class. All 
high ranked in the national hierarchy and all three have for a number of years achieved good 
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results. Additionally, one of the authors (MWH) has a past as an active A-class rider and is thus 
an insider to the culture. After having reviewed the literature, it is our assessments that this is the 
first time active Danish elite riders pass on their experiences with and attitudes to agreements on 
podium placing and trade with victories. Both a Belgian and an Australian study has previously 
briefly touched on the issue, but both had other primary interests and thus did not deal with it  at 
length (Fincoeur, 2010; Hardie, Shilbury, Ware, & Bozzi, 2010). Although the Danish context is 
our point of departure, the discussion and analysis addresses the sport as such and is thus not 
limited to any specific national context. Names and places have been changed or omitted in order 
to secure riders' anonymity.
2. On guard
In the media, cycling lives a paradoxical life. On the one hand it  is the third most popular 
sport in Denmark4 after European football and team handball, wherefore riders – and especially 
those who are employed by the Pro-Tour teams – can expect quite some attention from the press. 
On the other hand, since the doping relegations in Tour de France in 1998, riders have gotten 
used to a media that also have a critical eye on the sport. Riders have therefore felt a pressure to 
be extra-ordinarily observant to not attract negative media attention. When in the preparation 
phase for this study we contacted potential informants, their precaution and scepticism was 
evident. Without rejecting that the phenomenon of trading, buying and selling victories exists, 
one rider explained in an e-mail, that he did not want to participate since he felt  that  the sport had 
had more than enough of negative exposure in relation to the doping problem, and that  there was 
no reason to once again declare the sport of cycling in crisis.5  Such a viewpoint is 
understandable. Often riders' morality  has been questioned. The verdict has come quickly and 
nuances and critical reflexion have been the rare exception. So, if there is anything the sport  does 
not need, it is another simplified and stigmatising representation of riders as cheaters.
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Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland.  Source: http://mostpopularsports.net/cycling-popularity [visited 
27 August 2013]
5 In his suspicion of the media not being able to treat the matter in a nuanced manner,  he was right.  When the Danish 
tabloid daily, BT, got hold of a Danish language version of this paper they had this caption in yellow on the front-
page: "There IS match-fixing in Danish cycling" (Staghøj, 2012).
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But perhaps cycling is not totally  blameless, if the outside world should perceive 
agreements and alliances between riders of opposing teams as morally problematic. The 
experienced sports director and former professional rider Johnny Weltz, stated in 2001, when he 
was sports director at Team CSC WorldOnline, that if such agreements were revealed on his team 
the involved riders would be sacked: "I almost consider it as sacrilege to sell a victory, and it is 
my firm conviction that if a man is found guilty of such a thing he should be freed from his 
duties immediately" (Jacobsen, 2001). Now, from his own career as rider and sports director 
(also on US Postal) Weltz knew very well what was going on, and that such agreements do take 
place. But it is just as obvious that if a leader in cycling makes such a statement to the press, it is 
not something that boosts the incentive for active riders to discuss the issue
3. The paradoxical life in the saddle
Life for an elite cyclist is characterised by privations on the part of the rider's social life 
and family, as well as a lifestyle marked by  what has been characterised as 'ascetic discipline' in 
relation to diet, training and recovery (Christiansen, 2005; Hamilton & Coyle, 2012; Hardie et 
al., 2010; Kimmage, 2001). On top of this, wages in Danish elite cycling are low and many riders 
on the national teams ride without even getting paid. And if they are, wages correspond to what 
students receive through study grants. Also prize money  is not big in Denmark, and the potential 
to win money from participation in foreign races is limited to very few riders. On occasion, a 
sponsor will offer an extra prize in connection with a prestigious race, but that money  goes to the 
team – which operates on a tight budget – and not to individual riders. The low wages are also a 
result of the fact that the Danish media's interest in cycling is reserved to big international races 
and not the Danish A-Class, wherefore the exposure is insignificant. The motivation to perform 
and get results therefore is not caused by  the financial returns from victories. When riders 
explain what it  is that makes them accept the many privations, it thus is not the money  they 
emphasise. One rider, John, explains:
“I believe it's that feeling you get when things go your way. That feeling is hard to find 
anywhere else. Some days it can be really  strenuous with training, if the weather is bad. 
But perhaps it's those few very good days that makes all the other days worthwhile. When 
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finally there is some success […] it  gives a kick, which I don't think I've found anywhere 
else.”
Another rider, Simon, points at something similar when he says that it  is "that feeling you 
get in your body  when you've won a race or something similar. To win means everything for 
athletes."
The statements are in line with the thesis of victory being the pivotal point and absolute 
value in sport (Christiansen & Møller, 2007; Møller, 2010). But if it  is also true that agreement 
on podium placing, and buying and selling of victories is not unfamiliar to the sport, a paradox 
arises: How can one, on the one hand, have victory as the absolute value and, on the other, be 
willing to trade it away for, perhaps, a small amount?
Part of the explanation can be found in the structure of bicycle racing.
4. Wind resistance and cooperation
Road racing is unlike other sports in that it  is a competition between teams but is won by 
an individual rider. In the competition wind resistance is the primary external factor the team 
organise itself around. In a breakaway group, the power required to overcome air resistance is 
reduced because the lead can be shared, with trailing riders sheltering or drafting behind leading 
riders. By riding close behind each other's wheels, riding a paceline, sheltered riders can thus 
diminish wind resistance by up to 38 %. For a speed of 32 km/h that results in an estimated 
reduction in VO2 of 27%, for a speed of 40 km/h it  reduces VO2 of  31% (Olds, 1998). The 
higher the speed the more benefit there is from drafting since the power needed to overcome 
wind resistance increases with the velocity  lifted to the power of three. Those who ride on the 
front of the peloton allow other riders to travel at the same velocity with substantially  lower 
energy expenditure. It is thus a major advantage to let others do the hard work in front, but it is 
also a naïve rider who allows competitors to sit in and shelter all the way  to the final, just to let 
them sprint by and take victory. To avoid such things from happening, a tacit social contract is 
formed among the riders in the breakaway  where one cooperates and shares the toil with the 
wind in the front. Ideally, everyone in the breakaway contributes equally to the work, and the 
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contract can be disbanded shortly before the finish line, where each rider will employ individual 
tactics to pursue victory (Albert, 1991).
In practically  all other sports (i.e. sports that are at, or could be considered for, the Olympic 
programme, see also note 3), this level of cooperation between competitors is regarded as 
unsportsmanlike, since it  is considered destructive for the ideal of the competition's objectivity 
and transparency. Cycling is abnormal because cooperation between competitors is an integrated 
element of the competition.6 For the novice this means that he has to learn to shift his perspective 
on his competitors. In the one moment he must cooperate (in order to keep  distance to the 
chasing peloton, for instance), in the next he has to disregard the cooperation and compete (for 
victory). A racing cyclist thus has to internalise an ideology where competition is dynamic rather 
than static, and where he must be able to change the perspective from pure opposition to close 
cooperation and back again (Albert, 1991; Christiansen, 2005).
In the beginning of a 200 km long road race everyone feels strong and fit. The early phase 
of the race is characterised by constant sprint-like accelerations from riders trying to break free 
from the peloton. This is physically demanding, and as more riders gradually get drained, a 
group of stronger riders often succeeds in escaping the peloton and forms a breakaway. Yet, the 
typically five to ten riders that take part in the breakaway, find themselves in a situation which on 
paper is much harder than that for the perhaps 100 riders who are left in the peloton, since they 
are fewer to share the work of breaking the wind. It is thus decisive to have a sound form of 
cooperation established in the group of breakaways. The riders, in other words, need to get the 
social contract under control, and if necessary make it explicit.
5. Agreements
Immediately  after the formation of a breakaway, all riders are usually willing to fight hard 
to make distance to the peloton. In order for a breakaway not to get caught by the peloton, 
cooperation needs to work flawlessly. If one or two riders sit in and save their strengths, the 
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chances of the breakaway diminish. But for the individual it is an obvious advantage to skip  a 
lead or two in the front, in order to save energy and thereby increase one's own chances in the 
final. But this also increases the risk of the breakaway getting caught. Therefore; when the riders 
sense that  the breakaway can survive to the finish, negotiations begin with possible agreements 
on the final results.  If an agreement that everyone can accept is reached, the cooperation can 
work flawlessly, since everyone knows that  they will gain something from their effort. 
Agreements are thus most often formed with the purpose of securing the existence of the 
breakaway. But at the same time they stand in stark contrast to the traditional zero-sum nature of 
sport (what one part wins, the other loses), and shows that the social contract among riders is not 
always ideal, but sometimes prosaic.
On the importance of forming agreements John says:
“They can mean everything! If everyone has their own agenda, and everyone wants to win, 
then you can't cooperate as you should, and you end up with half-hearted pulls in the front. 
These kinds of breakaways are doomed to fail. […] It  is perhaps first in the last quarter [of 
the race] that agreements start being formed, and it is only there, one can start to see the 
difference in how strong the various riders [in the breakaway] are. Then you enter into the 
last part [of the race], where differences become more obvious, and then you can voice if 
you just want to sit in the wheel, and give up going for victory.”
If a rider stops participating in the work, the others will try  to clarify his motives. Is he 
tired out or is he being tactically, saving energy for his sprint?
Also, the fact that agreements are sometimes made is not tantamount to saying that they are 
always made in any breakaway. Neither is it compulsory for anyone to be part of the agreements 
that are made. As long as he is honest (and e.g. do not enter into agreements, just to break them 
later), a rider who does not want to be part of an agreement is not looked down upon, although 
he does constitute an element of irritation for the others, as John explains:
“If you don't want to be part of the agreement, you can just  ride to win. But the rest of the 
group will then race against you, so they don't  end up in a situation, where you disrupt the 
others' agreements.”
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Thus, there is no requirement that one takes the deal, only  a tacit threat that if they don't, 
the deal makers will do what they can to ensure that the rider in question loses anyways.
Agreements on victories and (podium) positions exist in many  different varieties and with 
various designs.7 And it  is far from all races wherein agreements are made. Also, whether or not 
agreements are made there is always the uncertainty that the break is caught. In line with what 
happens in the breakaway group, the chasing peloton will try and organise itself with the aim of 
catching the breakaways and e.g. launch the sprinters for the final. Also here, agreements 
between chasing teams can be established.
However, when agreements are made in the leading group, irrespective of their concrete 
design, they most often have the purpose of securing the breakaway's existence and in addition to 
that (in breakaways that are certain not to get caught) to secure what internally in the breakaway 
group is regarded a fair distribution of positions and prizes.
If riders from the same team are overrepresented in a breakaway, they are naturally in a 
favourable position. But also in such situations, agreements in the breakaway group  may be 
needed, as Simon explains:
“You can find yourself in a breakaway where one team is strongly overrepresented 
compared to the other teams. That team then has the opportunity to ensure that the other 
teams get nothing. But then again, those who are in a majority  can also mess it up, and lose 
their almost certain victory. So, they all agree to make an arrangement where the team that 
has the majority gets victory and the others can then divide the rest of the good positions 
amongst them. Then, in principle, every team get a slice of the pie.”
To be in a majority situation is advantageous and the chance of victory is relatively high. 
Riders who are in a minority are placed in a correspondingly bad situation. To secure 
collaboration in the breakaway the riders who are in minority  must be sure to get their "slice of 
the pie"; otherwise there is no reason for them to take part  in the work. Correspondingly, the 
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team who are in majority needs to be confident that victory  is theirs, so they do not drag a 
competitor all the way to victory.
In instances where the distribution of power is not skewed it may be necessary to offer 
some kind of quid pro quo if one wants to make an agreement on victory. Peter gives an account 
of one time when he was involved in an agreement. 
“We were in [this town] when I was in a breakaway with [a strong rider] Magnus and [a 
young up and coming talent] Frederic. Magnus wanted to win ‘cause he and his team 
where on home ground. And perhaps I was in a breakaway which was a bit too strong for 
me, so I just wanted not to get dropped. Frederic went down [to the sport director's car] to 
talk to Magnus' sports director, and shortly thereafter Magnus goes: "Now, we do so and 
so; I break away on this and that time, and then we are [Magnus] first, [Frederic] second 
and [Peter] third.”
Q: Do you know what Frederic got out of that agreement?
I don't  know if he maybe got some money, but I do know that he is on Magnus' team now. 
But you can be sure he was offered something. He rode for [another big team] back then, 
and for him the race in [that particular town] isn't important. And there is this standing 
agreement that when you race in [that  particular town], then it's Magnus' team that  wins, 
because it's their home ground, and it's the same with the other bigger teams in Denmark.”
Given the importance of victory for Magnus, his sports director and his team, it  is an 
obvious conclusion that money or a future contract was part  of the negotiations between Magnus, 
Frederic and the sports director. What exactly Frederic obtained in the negotiations we do not 
know, but according to Peter a home ground victory  would trigger a sponsor bonus of DKK 
50,000-100,000 (€7,000-14,000) to Magnus' team. Even if that money does not  go into Magnus' 
but to the team's pockets, it illustrates the importance of settling negotiations on victory. By 
comparison, prize money for a victory in the A-Class is normally around DKK 800 (€110).
But having that amount of money  as part of the calculation is the exception rather than the 
rule, when agreements are negotiated. "Most often money isn't part of it. It's more like you owe 
one another something", John explains. By voluntarily  ceding victory  and making do with a 
secondary  position, riders can establish a “credit” from the rider and the team who gets victory. 
Peter offers an example of how this works:
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“When you're in a race, teams ride against each other and try to establish a winning 
situation on their team by, for example, being in the majority  in the final. And if you're in a 
breakaway of six riders, where three are from the same team, then you're in a good position 
to win the race. Then maybe one of the three others says: "I've got no problem in you guys 
winning; I just want  to be second or third". By doing that he puts a little deposit in the 
bank, and then you know that you can make an agreement with him some other time or 
vice versa. That's how things work.”
By abstaining from racing for victory, and by that putting a "deposit  in the bank" at the 
other riders, the rider earns a credit from the winning rider and his team, which he can draw on in 
the future. At the same time, the team that was in majority converts the likely victory to a certain 
victory. This demonstrates how the general zero-sum nature of sport is sometimes suspended in 
cycling, since he who agrees losing (or not winning) in a breakaway wins something else – 
namely an improved chance of winning future races. Hence, the ‘wealth’ of the sport is 
distributed not only according to riders’ strengths and luck in the actual race, but also according 
to their known records of sharing and contribution in previous races. Riders may therefore 
engage in a kind of long-term strategic thinking about victories that is unfamiliar to other sports.
Irrespective of how normal the phenomenon is, the informants do not expect people from 
outside the sport  to have an understanding for the agreements that are made in cycling. On 
spectators' and other sports interested peoples' attitude to riders' praxis, Simon says:
“Most people haven't tried it, and it  doesn't really  take place in other sports, I think. I 
believe it's only internally between riders that  one really knows. And on the face of it, it 
seems totally wrong and illogically to accept not winning a race, just because someone else 
perhaps needs the victory more than you do. But inside cycling it seems quite logically and 
generous to give it away, if somebody needs it more than you.”
It may sound noble, but it is not. At least not  completely. It is also self-interest. Any rider 
who offers to give away a position knows that in the next race he may be the one who will be in 
need of another’s help. Hence, victories are not given away  in pure altruism. The informants all 
know about giving away a victory or another top-spot, but it  happens in the expectation of a 
return of the gesture, as Peter explains:
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                       Ask Christiansen & Martin Wang
Fair Play ISSN: 2014-9255
76
“If it is internal on the team, then I expect nothing. That's part of being a team, and you're 
loyal to your team-mates. And we usually say that the wheel is round, and it  will come 
back to you some other time. But if it's between two different teams I certainly expect to 
get something back later.”
6. Reciprocal altruism
Even though we are looking at concrete actions among people with distinct social relations 
in a specific cultural context, the phenomenon of agreeing on victories, podium placing and 
prizes can be understood in the light of what since the beginning of the 1970s in socio-biology 
and evolutionary psychology has been known as reciprocal altruism.8  Reciprocal altruism is a 
concept introduced by  evolutionary psychologist  Robert Trivers to understand the kind of 
collaboration that  can be observed between non-kin individuals. It  designates the kind of 
behaviour where an individual acts in a way that momentarily reduces its own fitness or chances 
of surviving, but increases another individual's fitness, with the expectance that the other will 
behave in a similar way at a later time. Contrary  to pure altruism, which for instance was 
suggested to be the foundation stone in utopian communism, reciprocal altruism is sensitive to 
cheaters who want to profit from the work of others but not contribute themselves. This is why 
reciprocal altruism may  have developed with evolution, and exists as a fundamental feature in 
man. As Harvard Professor Steven Pinker explains: "Reciprocators who help  others, who have 
helped them, and who shun or punish others who have failed to help them, will enjoy the benefits 
of gains in trade and outcompete individualists, cheaters and pure altruists." Also, humans are 
psychologically well equipped for the demands of reciprocal altruism: "They remember each 
other as individuals […], have an eagle eye and a flypaper memory  for cheaters" and possess 
moralistic feelings such as "liking, sympathy, gratitude, guilt, shame, and anger" (Pinker, 2002, 
255).
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                       Ask Christiansen & Martin Wang
Fair Play ISSN: 2014-9255
8   Other theoretical approaches could of course have been applied here (e.g. management theory, theory of work 
dynamics, sociology of work,  sociology of deviance, game theory, Mauss' study on the gift, etc.).  They would 
probably all have revealed something interesting.  The decision to apply 'reciprocal altruism' as the theoretical 
framework here is due to the fact that it, being associated with evolutionary psychology, can help explain elements 
of human behaviour that, although they appear connected to a specific cultural and social setting have roots in our 
common evolutionary past, and thus are of a more universal nature. If the phenomenon can be explained by referring 
to evolved emotional and cognitive adaptations that represent a human psychological nature, we believe that 
understanding of the phenomenon is added in a way that is not the case had we only referred to the local cultural 
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When Peter, as part of an agreement in a breakaway, has accepted not to race for the 
victory, he has done so with the expectance to have the favour returned later on. By that he 
chooses not to reach for the small chance he had in the specific race, to instead have an 
advantageous starting point for a result in a future race. He shows that he is 'generous', as Simon 
says, by not racing for victory but continue to contribute to the work of the group, while he 
simultaneously  lends his support to the outlined plan for distribution that ensures everybody a 
piece of the pie. Such behaviour, with its traits of reciprocal altruism, is thus connected to the 
suspension of the sports’ zero-sum nature, which was discussed above. 
The risk, of course, is that someone may try and cheat. That someone will be part of an 
agreement and then break it shortly before the finish line in order to take the victory he wants so 
badly. When answering the question on whether agreements are ever broken and the possible 
consequences hereof, John spells it  out: "It's totally  unheard of. If you do that, you're in really 
bad standing. And it  will spread like wildfire through the peloton grapevine that he has done so 
and so, and he isn't  to be relied on." In general the riders have difficulties in recalling examples 
where agreements have been broken, and they have even more difficulties in imagining a 
situation where they themselves broke an agreement. On the consequences that  would have, 
Simon states:
“Firstly  the rider wouldn't be allowed to be part of a breakaway  any longer. He would 
either be caught by the peloton or no one in the breakaway would work while he's there. 
And if he somehow would be allowed in a breakaway it would only  happen if he was in a 
huge minority situation. And everybody in the breakaway would race against  him, and he 
would have no chance whatsoever to play any part in the final.”
The message is clear. If you break an agreement in order to win on your own, everybody 
will see to it that you will not win anything in the races you participate in, from this time 
forward. The peloton will "shut you down", as it  is called, to make sure that you will not race for 
future victories.
If you break an agreement, you cheat your competitors in a situation where they trust you. 
That kind of cheating threatens the peloton's capability for future collaboration, and if such 
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egotistic behaviour should thrive it would break down the peloton's behaviour of sharing and 
reciprocity. Therefore, riders in the peloton stand shoulder to shoulder in sanctioning such 
cheaters.
The economist Ernst Fehr has labelled such a reaction strong reciprocity. This concept is 
used to describe how a community will restrain those who cheat and act parasitic on behalf of the 
majority, by sanction and punishment. For instance studies based game theory shows that 
humans, in order to reciprocate what they consider unjustified parasitic behaviour on the 
community, are willing to make personal sacrifices to sanction the cheater, even if it was not 
them who were the injured part. A violation of the community's agreements will stick to the 
sinner with consequences for the far future. (se e.g. Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002).
To illustrate how this works, Simon recalls an incident at  the Tour of Denmark, where it 
was not an explicit agreement, but one of the sport's unwritten rules that was violated. A foreign 
team launched an attack while the yellow jersey – which at the time was worn by Danish Jacob 
Fuglsang – was off the bike for a pee early at a stage. Because of the attack Fuglsang had to 
spend a lot of energy getting back to the peloton:
“It's totally  unacceptable to do such a thing. The majority of the peloton will then 
cooperate to make sure that that team won't get any  results in the rest of the race. And it's 
somewhat the same that happens if a rider breaks an agreement like the ones we talk about 
here. There is no set  rule for how long you are in the black book. Usually the peloton pretty 
much agrees on that. And it isn't something you talk a lot about, it's just something you do 
– it feels natural.”
And the social sanctions seem to work. Agreements are (as a rule) not broken and riders 
does not (as a rule) cheat each other. It is not in the riders' interest since the consequences are too 
extensive. Cyclists that break an agreement reduces their own chance of survival in the future so 
much so that any small gain is outweighed by the larger loss. Further, it  will be almost 
impossible for a cheater to later find his place as part of the peloton. As Peter express it  when 
asked to relate to how he would feel about violating an agreement: "You know, if I should ever do 
that, I would prefer it to be in my last race!" The social order of the peloton is thus maintained 
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through sanctions and punishment which ensures that cheating and parasitic behaviour does not 
gain ground.
7. Unsportsmanlike?
Two issues remain unsolved, however: The thesis on the absolute value of victory in sport 
and the sporting and moral consequence of the agreements.
Firstly, we can point out that the agreements in cycling shows that the thesis that "sport has 
victory as its pivotal point and its absolute value" (Møller, 2010, 24) either has to be modified or 
qualified. It can be modified to the following: "sport has victory as its pivotal point and its 
central value". The will to victory is the central value that is the cause for the fight between 
riders to enter into the decisive breakaway. But the fact that there in the breakaway group is a 
willingness to let victory be part of a quid pro quo negotiation indicates that its value is not 
absolute. Not here and now at least. With a longer time perspective in view, the thesis can 
alternatively be qualified. Because it is indeed the desire to win in the future that make the 
individual rider, in the actual situation, weigh his potential for victory  and perhaps yield on his 
little chance now for a better opportunity  later. In this respect victory is still the absolute value 
and driving force for the decisions that are made.
Secondly  there is the money. Vinokourov presumably paid Kolobnev for his assistance. In 
Elmgreen's example one rider received the prize money for not sprinting (genuinely) for victory. 
Our informants all knew of instances where money  had been involved in an agreement among 
riders in the decisive breakaway. That other teams' assistance can be bought is also known and 
considered among Under 23 riders in the Danish national team (Christiansen, 2005, 143-44), and 
among Belgian riders (Fincoeur, 2010). In line with this, the then sports director at continental 
Team fakta, Peter Sejer Nielsen, in 2001 told Politiken: 
“It is a well-known part of the strategy that  certain agreements are made, where also 
money  is involved. And for me there is nothing reprehensible in individual riders, or a 
whole team for that matter, allows themselves to be hired to assist others, when they have 
had their day. That has nothing to do with buying victories.” (Jacobsen, 2001)
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Sejer Nielsen probably  shares that point of view with many others in the sport. Money 
exchange hands between riders, and if needed it  is possible to buy the help of others. Riders 
know this; it is accepted in the culture and is not regarded as cheating. But it is not as 
uncontroversial as Sejer Nielsen will have it. In fact Sejer Nielsen speaks about two phenomena 
that have to be dealt with separately: First, buying individual riders help in the front of the race, 
second controlling the race from the peloton by buying the assistance of whole teams. Whereas 
the former is in line with the subject matter of this paper (cf. the Vinokourov example), the latter 
is something different, more radical and also ethically more problematic. Space does not allow 
for an exhaustive discussion of the latter situation, but let us just briefly touch upon it. For 
instance, buying one or more whole teams in order to control the pace in the peloton to avoid 
breakaways or to chase back a breakaway un-levels the playing field in a radical way. If a team 
captain has, say, 17 or 26 helpers instead of eight, the power balance of the race has shifted 
dramatically. And it  has so from the back or the peloton of the race. This is different from making 
agreements on podium positions or buying and selling one’s assistance in a breakaway  group, 
since riders with effort have to have brought themselves into such a position.
However, the former phenomenon, where money exchange hands in the front of the race, 
in the breakaway group, also needs consideration, since it  raises the question on whether a line 
between legitimate and non-legitimate agreements can be drawn. It seems obvious that 
Vinokourov and Kolobnev were no less (or no more) corrupt had only 100,000 euros been 
exchanged between them. Or 10,000 or 1,000 euros. Hence, it does not  appear to be the amount 
of money  being involved that makes the behaviour corrupt or not. The decisive factor seems to 
be the sheer act of being willing to renounce victory  with the expectation of getting some kind of 
quid pro quo. This can be either as money or as assistance in pursuing a victory on a similar level 
some other time. The only obvious condition that supports money exchange being ethically more 
problematic than physical assistance is that money  can come from external sources, and thus be 
influenced by a third party  (see below), whereas support in future races can only come from the 
rider himself. When riders chose money  as opposed to returning the assistance in a future race, it 
is likely  due to the fact  that the involved riders cannot expect in the foreseeable future to be in a 
situation where the reciprocity can be met. The Danish A-class has been the point of departure 
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for this study. Here it is often the same riders, and the same favourites, that meet for races 
weekend after weekend. This is why money rarely  is involved, since riders with a high degree of 
likelihood can expect to have their favour returned on the same level at a later race. 
Both phenomena thus hold the potential for corruption: If a team can buy  the assistance of 
another team, then why not buy the assistance of two teams? Or three or four teams? Or the 
entire peloton? If a rider can secure a victory by paying the other riders in the break for not 
sprinting wholeheartedly  in the final, then it  could be possible for a sponsor to sit in the wings 
and double (or triple or quadruple) the amount to secure victory. And if a sponsor can do that, a 
gambling syndicate in Asia could potentially do the same. Such hypothetical extrapolations of 
the phenomenon to a level far beyond what we have empirical foundation for claiming is 
practised in reality, makes it  evident that the culture of agreements in cycling implies the 
possibility of full blown corruption of the sport.
Still, both versions of the phenomenon differ from match-fixing in football (or other team 
sports) where the result has been agreed upon or fixed before the match. This is not  the case in 
cycling. Or at least  we have no evidence that this has happened in cycling (except for the post 
Tour de France criteriums, where the top  three has known to be fixed for a long time (Jones, 
2002)). Agreements in cycling have to be made during the race, which makes them dependent on 
riders’ skills and abilities rather than external powers.
On this basis it can be concluded that the sport  of cycling is paradoxical in its essence, 
since it contains the precondition for its own destruction. The agreements are part and parcel of 
the basis of the sport. Without the social contract (tacit or explicit) on sharing the workload, few 
breakaways would escape the peloton, and most races would have to be decided in a mass sprint. 
Thus, the social contracts (verbal or non-verbal, with or without agreements) are the sports' 
precondition without which it could not  exist (except in the form of time trials or races in 
mountains). But with the necessary acceptance of the social contract and the agreements in the 
break, the sport's zero sum nature is also suspended. That suspension entails a potential 
corruption of the sport.
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8. Conclusion
Even if it is not common knowledge, agreements on victories and placing are often made 
in road races. The riders naturally  know how to put on the show for the crowd and the media, and 
attune the use of grinding teeth, celebration and disappointment in accordance with their role and 
placing. The fact that  riders regard these agreements as a natural and integrated part of the races' 
modus vivendi is partly because they are necessary in order to secure collaboration in the group 
and reinforce the breakaway's sustainability. Partly because they  are based on reciprocal altruism, 
whereby a band of loyalty and reciprocity is established between riders, which enhance the 
donor's possibility of achieving results in the future. Finally the agreements have a socialising 
aspect, in that the willingness to enter into agreements is reinforced by the awareness of clear 
sanctions if an agreement is violated. Thus, the agreements are both the sport's precondition and 
part and parcel of cycling's social and cultural foundation. But the agreements and the social 
contract that is established among the riders in a breakaway also contain – even in their ideal 
form – a corruption of the sport in germ form.
It is therefore only the culture and the riders own self-discipline that can act as bulwark 
against real corruption of the sport. In reality it is these two conditions that must secure that  an 
agreement about victory cannot be entered into by anyone, but those who have a genuine chance 
of winning. And as the sport has been practised hitherto, a weak rider cannot – disregarding his 
financial resources – negotiate a good placing. Before being able to enter into negotiations (and 
subsequently  maybe win a race), riders have to have the skills and the strength to place 
themselves in a situation where such negotiations are relevant – that is in the breakaway in the 
last or most decisive part of the race. Thus, “you cannot”, as Elmgreen states, “buy something 
you aren't”. Riders' praxis therefore should not be seen as being on par with the kind of match 
fixing that has been uncovered in European football, but rather as agreements in the game.
It can thus be concluded that  even though there is a risk of corruption built into the 
agreements and the social contract, the culture of agreements in effect upholds and reinforces a 
certain social order rather than it is an expression of corrupt morale among cyclists as a group.
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Thus, it is up  to the culture and the socialisation of young riders to make sure that, with a 
formulation borrowed from Kay Werner, one of Denmark's all-time greatest six-day  riders, "no 
one who hasn't got the class will have the laurel wreath hung around their neck."
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